Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information about participants' choices by using both direct-response (as Cox) and strategy method. By the latter we are able to control reciprocity for initial inequality, which is endogenous when reciprocity is investigated. We show that the triadic design well-captures reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations by a fixed-fee incentive scheme and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. We expect that if trust is reported by the triadic design, investors' expected gains should be also observed. Finally, we test the existence of an emotional bias, i.e. we test if expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.
Introduction
Observations from the experimental design make conditional and unconditional motivations difficult to clearly distinguish (Manski, 2002) . For instance, in an investment game, investors may send positive amounts because they want to trigger trust mechanisms (conditional) or because they are just motivated by altruism or inequality aversion (unconditional).
1 Cox (2004) proposes a triadic design to distinguish conditional from unconditional motivations by comparing the outcomes of an investment game to those arising from counterfactual scenarios where actions can only be unconditional.
2 Specifically, Cox attempts to find evidence for (net or conditional) trust and reciprocity 3 by assuming that in dictator games actions are only driven by unconditional motivations. Then evidence for trust is obtained as a positive difference between the average amounts sent by investors and dictators. Similarly, evidence for reciprocity is obtained as the difference between the average amounts sent by trustees and dictators in a game where the initial endowments of dictators were built by the experimenter to replicate those faced by the trustees in the investment game. 4 The evidence from triadic designs is somehow mixed. Although some studies report evidence of conditional motivations, 5 often experiments based on the triadic design fail to observe trust and reciprocity. 6 These results seem to suggest that a major share of what has commonly been interpreted as trust-based transfers may be motivated only by altruism (Brulhart and Usunier, 2008, 2012) . However, as pointed out by Cox (2004) , the logic of the triadic design is to provide sufficient but not necessary conditions for the outside observer to be able to conclude from experimental observations that subjects have exhibited trust or reciprocity. Thus the Brulhart and Usunier's (2008, 2012 ) point is not definitive.
As Cox (2004) delivers sufficient conditions, our paper aims to enforce his approach by considering the following two extensions: a) we introduce the strategy method (SM) in addition to the direct-response method (DM) to collect more information about the trustees' actions; b) we collect information about participants' expectations to test their coherence with the indications derived from the triadic design.
Our motivations are explained more in details in the rest of this section.
A possible explanation for the mixed empirical evidence from the triadic design can be -noise‖-at least for reciprocity. The trustee should decide how much to send back to the investor given the amount he received (initial conditions). Then reciprocity can be found by comparing his action to the choice of a dictator derived from a counterfactual situation: a dictator game with the same initial condition (i.e., initial degree of inequality 7 ) imposed by the experimenter.
Aggregating the choices of the experimental and control groups, noise can emerge because initial conditions are endogenous as they are determined by the investors' 2 See also Guth et al. (1982) . 3 As Cox (2004) , by -trust‖ and -reciprocity‖ we always mean conditional trust and conditional positive reciprocity or trustworthiness. 4 Clearly in the investment game, trustees' endowments are endogenous as they are determined by how much the investors sent. 5 See e.g. Cox (2004) , McCabe et al. (2003) , Deck (2005, 2006) , Cox at al. (2008) . 6 See, e.g., Ashraf et al. (2006) , Capra et al. (2008) , Cox (2002 , 2009 ), Innocenti and Pazienza (2008a , 2008b , Carter and Castillo (2011). 7 It is worth noticing that at the beginning of the experiment both the investor and the trustee are endowed with the same amount of money, thus the amount sent by the investor will generate inequality. The larger the amount is, the greater the inequality is. Exactly the same inequality is then replicated in the dictator game, by the experiment, when the counterfactual is built.
choices. Specifically, the experimental and control groups are obtained aggregating the answers of trustees and dictators, respectively. Although the choice of each trustee is done considering the same initial condition of the corresponding dictator by construction, each pair can be associated to a different initial condition according to the choice of the investor. So outcomes of the sample are conditional to a given vector of initial conditions, which is itself a random variable. If the Cox's experiment is replicated, different trustees' reactions may just depend on a different vector of initial conditions. If inequality plays a role, 8 results will be then strongly dependent on the specific degree of inequality generated in the sample. To eliminate this noise a larger sample is required or an experimental design that allows for inequality should be considered.
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The above problem can be overcome by following Stanca et al. (2009) . A more sophisticate way to collect information about trustees' actions is in fact to use the SM proposed by Selten (1967) -in addition to the DM used by Cox (2004) . Specifically, the SM consists of asking the trustee to make conditional choices for each feasible investor' action (i.e., each possible degree of inequality) before being informed of his actual choice. From the SM, we can then verify the existence of reciprocity by comparing the difference between the average amount sent by trustees and the average amount sent by counterfactual dictators controlling for each degree of inequality (i.e., initial conditions).
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We also test the robustness of results obtained from the triadic design with the coherence of participants' expectations-as suggested by Coricelli et al. (2006) . The idea is simple: if investors are involved in a real investment, we expect that they would always send an amount lower than their expected payoff. Then trust observed in the triadic design should be associated to a positive difference between average expected payback and amount sent by the investors. By contrast, if we do not observe trust in the triadic design we should also observe that investors' expected gains are zero concluding that motivations are only related to altruism.
Finally, information derived from expectations can be used to further explore the investors' and trustees' choices. For instance, combining observations from SM, DM and expectations, we can investigate issues such as emotional bias due to the lack of fulfillment of expectations; i.e., we can test the existence of a sort of punishment (or extra-regard) when the trustee receives less (or more) than he expected.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment design. Section 3 illustrates and discusses our main outcomes. Section 4 concludes. Cox (2004) suggests that evidence of conditional motivations can be found by a counterfactual approach, i.e. by comparing the outcomes of an experiment where the actions of participants are expected to be driven by both conditional and unconditional motivations to those arising from counterfactual scenarios where motivations can be only unconditional. Thus, our experiment is based on three treatments (T1, T2, and T3): the first treatment is an investment game whereas T2 and T3 are two dictator games. In each of them two subjects (A and B) interact.
The experiment design and procedures

Treatments and assumptions
The treatments are described as follows.
Definition (T1).
Both A (investor) and B (trustee) are endowed with 10 tokens. Subjects interact in two stages where they can increase or decrease their initial endowments depending on their choices. In the first stage, A can transfer to B part, all or none of his endowment (i.e., from 0 to 10 tokens) to B. Any amount transferred is multiplied by 3 before being delivered to B. In the second stage, B could transfer part, all or none of the tripled amount of tokens received from A. Payoffs are the initial endowments plus the tokens received minus those sent.
Definition (T2).
Both A (dictator) and B are endowed with 10 tokens. The treatment only consists of one stage where A can transfer to B part, all or none of his endowment; any amount transferred is multiplied by 3 before being delivered to B.
Definition (T3)
. This is another dictator game where A is endowed by X tokens and B (dictator) by 10 plus Y=3(10X) tokens. As T2, the treatment only consists of one stage where B can transfer to A part, all or none of Y tokens.
According to the Cox's triadic design, the initial endowments of the dictators in T3 will be built by the experimenter to replicate those faced by the trustees in the investment game T1. It is worth noticing that in T3, participants do not know the underlying motivations about how their initial endowments are determined.
In all treatments if agents are selfish the perfect sub-game Nash equilibrium implies that nothing is sent, the proof is trivial. Our assumptions about players' motivations are as follows.
Assumption 1. We assume that if an agent is not selfish, in T1 he may be willing to transfer tokens for both conditional and unconditional motivations.
Specifically, agent A may send positive amounts because: a) he trusts that some of the tripled amount transferred will be returned (trust or conditional other-regarding preferences); b) he is motivated by altruism (unconditional other-regarding preferences). Agent B may transfer tokens to A because: a) he may understand A's underlying motivation and could send a positive payback in response to a trusting behavior; b) he is motivated by altruism or inequality aversion.
Assumption 2. We assume that if a player is not selfish, in T2 or T3 he will transfer tokens only because of unconditional motivations.
In T2, agent A cannot have positive expectations about a feasible payback from agent B, because B does not have the opportunity to return any tokens that he could receive, therefore player A cannot be motivated by trust, but only by altruism (unconditional other-regarding preferences). Similarly, as in T3 the endowment distribution is independent of A's choices; B cannot be motivated by a trustworthiness behavior, but only by altruism or inequality aversion.
The choice of B is collected by using both strategy (SM) and decision method (DM). During the experiment, B has to make: a) a conditional choice, for each feasible action of A, before being informed about the actual choice made by A (SM); b) a choice after being informed about A's actual decision (DM).
At the end of the experiment, all subjects know that they will be randomly paid according the choice reported in SM or DM.
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During T1, we also collect the expectations about the other subjects' choice. Specifically, by defining a and b the amount sent respectively by A and B, expectations have been collected as follows. In the first stage of the investment game, before they make their choice, we asked subject A to provide an expectation on agent B's payback (b) for each feasible A's strategy, i.e. E A (b|a). At the beginning of stage two, we asked B's expectation about A's choice, i.e. E B (a).
In order to motivate participants to reveal their expectations we used a payment incentive scheme as Coricelli et al. (2006) . In particular, we elicited subject's expectations by using a fixed fee for each expectation correctly guessed.
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Summarizing the timing for T1 is described as follows. 
Hypotheses: Trust, reciprocity, altruism and expectations
According to Cox (2004) , by Assumption 1 and 2, evidence for trust can be found by comparing the average amount sent to T1 and T2 by agents A.
14 Formally, we then tested (H1) if the average amount sent by agents A in T1 was greater than T2:
11 The evidence about the DM and SM equivalence is mixed. See Bardsley et al. (2010) , Brandts and Charness (2011), Cox et al. (2012) . In particular, Cox et al. (2012) stress that use of random selection of one decision for payoff can produce cross-task contamination in the data (see footnote 13 below). 12 Experimental evidence in eliciting subjects' expectations or beliefs show that effort and accuracy in the presence of a flat fee are comparable with the results obtained by implementing the quadratic scoring rule (Sonnemans and Offerman, 2001 ). See Bardsley et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion about expectation elicitation. 13 As subjects make all decisions in a within-subjects design, cross-task contamination may emergeespecially between 4) and 5). We check the data for possible inconsistencies about the issue of whether DM and SM elicit different data. Similarly, in order to find evidence for reciprocity we compare the outcome sent by agents B in T1 to those sent in T3 on the average. Formally, we test (H2) if the average payback actually sent in T1 by agents B is greater than in T3:
We test reciprocity twice, by using information collected from the actual choice of B after a is revealed (DM) and by using conditional choice before the actual choice is revealed (SM).
As discussed above, we extend the triadic design for reciprocity by collecting data from SM to control for inequality, i.e. for each initial inequality degree (), in comparing average amounts sent in T1 and T3 by players B. Formally,
where the initial inequality degree is just measured by the token endowed by A, ; tokens of B are simply 10+3(10.
Following, Coricelli et al. (2006) , who point out that expectations may be important to understand trust, we assume that if the investor expects to receive a payback greater than his offer, one could say that he is motivated by trust. Formally, we test
H4: Trust test check E A (b) > a (for each feasible strategy)
We expect that if H1 is accepted, H4 is, too. By contrast, if E A (b) ≤ a, one can say that the investor is only motivated by altruist reasons and we expect to observe that H1 is not accepted.
16 Brandts and Charness (2011) show that some differences may emerge between DM and SM outcomes when emotions are taken into account, e.g. in games involving punishments. Thus, by using the information on expectations, we also test the existence of a sort of emotional bias. We assume that a mismatch of expectations and actions can generate different reactions. Specifically, if the trustee receives from the investor a greater amount than he expected (i.e., a -E B (a)>0), he may have sent an amount greater than the amount he planned to send (i.e., b>b|a). By contrast, if the trustee receives less than he expected (i.e., a -E B (a)<0), he may have sent an lower amount (i.e., b<b|a). Formally,
H5: Emotional bias a-E B (a)>0 ↔ b>b|a
It is worth noticing that H5 can be also tested for only positive or negative emotional biases by separately considering the case of positive and negative mismatches.
14 Indeed Cox (2004) considers non-parametric tests (Epps-Singleton and Mann-Whitney tests). We also consider these tests. 15 Again as Cox (2004) we consider parametric, non-parametric tests and Tobit regressions. The latter aims to capture the effects of the initial conditions faced by the agents B when they have to take their choices; as said, these conditions are endogenous since they depend on the investors' choices. Later we will further explore the point. See also Cox et al. (2008) for details. 16 However, recall that the triadic design provides sufficient but not necessary conditions for trust or reciprocity.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted in May 2012 at the Experimental Lab of the University of Teramo. Participants were undergraduate students recruited by e-mail using lists of voluntary potential candidates. 17 Subjects were randomly selected from the database. We ran two sessions for each treatment, with 30 subjects participating in each session, for a total amount of 180 participants and 6 sessions.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were required to provide identification cards; a database with name verifies that there was no repeat participation. Then all the participants were randomly divided into two groups (A and B) and placed in separate computer positions. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each subject of group A was matched to a subject of group B in a random and anonymous way and each treatment performed.
All the decisions made during the experiment were anonymous; anonymity was guaranteed by using identification codes, names remain unknown to all -including experimenter and monitors. During the experiment, two monitors checked that the instructions were correctly followed by participants. However, the monitors could not answer any questions from subjects as they had the same information. Therefore, if participants had doubts, they could only read the instructions again. Participants were not allowed to talk each other during the entire experiment. At the end of the experiment, all participants were anonymously paid.
Results
Table 1 displays average amounts sent in investment and dictator games to test net trust (H1) and reciprocity (H2) according to Cox's approach. In the first row we show the average amount sent by A subjects, which are 3,50 tokens in the investment game against the 2,73 in the dictator game. In the second row we show that the average amount sent by B subjects is 4,10 tokens (DM is used) in the investment game, against the 3,98 tokens in the dictator game.
The last row reports Tobit estimates of reciprocity effects. As pointed out by Cox (2004) and Cox et al. (2008) tests for reciprocity should not only be based on means; but they should also use a regression approach that is conditional on the amounts sent (or received). In detail, we estimate following relation between amounts sent by A (a) and amounts returned by B (b), in treatments T1 and T3:
where D is a dummy which assumes values equal to one if the observation i refer to T1 and T3, otherwise. The bounds for the Tobit estimation are those imposed by the experiment design 0 and 3a i . Following Cox (2004) , we also take account for multiplicative heteroskedasticity. We estimate  from  i = e a i . The coefficient  measures reciprocity.
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17 Lists were compiled in advance by using University mailing lists and advertisements placed on the University notice boards. 18 For more detail on the issue see Cox et al. (2008) . Observed net trust is small (only 0,77 tokens), but statistically different from zero-as shown by the t-test on the mean and the non-parametric Wilconox test. Net reciprocity is also small (0,12 tokens), but it is not statistically different from zero.
As a result, H1 must not be rejected, and therefore, although small quantitatively, we observe net trust, i.e., conditional other-regarding preferences seem to emerge in the game. By contrast, regarding reciprocity, H2 has to be rejected, and therefore, we do not observe net reciprocity, i.e., conditional other-regarding preferences do not seem to play any role-according to Cox's approach. The result is confirmed by the Tobit regression as  is not significantly different from zero.
In Table 2 we consider information from SM (planned choice conditional to the actual choice of A) instead of the DM (actual choice). Now the average amount sent by B players (5,03 tokens) is still not statistically different from that (3,98 tokens) sent by the dictators in T3. 20 Thus, as above, reciprocity does not matter. However, we find evidence for reciprocity when we run the Tobit estimation as  is positive and significantly greater than zero as in Cox (2004) . Our results display a sort of puzzle. Following Cox's approach, we find mixed evidence for conditional other-regarding preferences. We find evidence for senders (subjects A).
Regarding responders (subjects B) we do not find evidence by considering differences in means and find mixed results when we run the Tobit regressions.
It is worth noticing that Tobit regressions take account for the initial conditions. Different results derive from the different initial distributions endogenously generated by the experiment. As said in the introduction, the mixed of evidence in testing reciprocity may be related to the noise. Differently from DM used by Cox (2004) , SM also allowed us to control for initial inequality by comparing average amounts sent by agents B in T1 and in T3 for each feasible initial distribution of tokens. Moreover, by using all the data derived from the SM, we can run a Tobit model based on 600 observations instead of 60 as those reported in Table 1 and 2, including all possible initial conditions in the regression. We report our results in Table 3 . Now, for low inequality (first four rows), we find evidence for reciprocity. Large inequality however emphasizes the altruist (inequality aversion) behavior as an amount sent by B in T1 and T3, which are generally not statistically different. According to the Cox approach, considering average amounts, intentions do not matter for reciprocity (see Table 1 and 2); however, controlling for inequality we obtain a different result (Table 3) . Conditional motivations matter if the inequality is low; by contrast, if inequality increases, they have a second order effect and only altruism (inequality aversion) emerges. The Tobit regression also reports evidence for reciprocity.
In Table 4 we test the robustness of our results regarding trust. Following Coricelli et al. (2006) , we consider the average investors' expected gains (i.e., the difference between average expected paybacks and average amounts sent) for each feasible strategy. The results show that investors always expected a net gain from their investment.
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Therefore, they expect on average to be reciprocated by trustees for each amount sent. 21 The last two columns report the one tailed p-values associated with a mean difference t-test and median difference non-parametric test based on independent sample assumption, respectively. 22 With the exception of the number of single token sent by A where the expectations of paybacks on average are not statistically different between them. Finally, we test the evidence for an emotional bias, i.e. different actions from those planned when participants' expectations are not fulfilled. Our result is described in Figure 1 , where we plot the ordered expectation errors (a-E B (a)) and the corresponding difference between the actual and planned choices (DM-SM). An emotional bias should imply two increasing lines as we expect the difference between DM and SM grows with the expectation error.
Figure 1 -Emotional bias test
The figure shows that a mismatch of expectations does not generate any emotional bias. By looking at the data, we also do not find any correlation between the mismatched expectations and deviations from the planned choices. 23 The result is not surprising as, indeed, subjects B obtain what they expected. In fact, expectations are not statistically different from the amount sent by subjects on the average. 24 We have also tested for positive or negative emotional biases by separately considering the case of positive and negative mismatches. The results do not change.
Concluding remarks
Our paper extended the triadic design proposed by Cox (2004) to separate conditional and unconditional motivations. Eliciting participants' expectations by a fixed-fee incentive scheme and collecting data by using both the direct-response and the strategy method, we verified the robustness of observed trust from the triadic design with participants expectations and controlled results about reciprocity for initial inequality. Specifically, by using expectations, we verified that if trust is observed, expected gains for investors are also observed. By using the strategy method, we find evidence for reciprocity that is controlled for initial inequality. In fact, in the triadic design, counterfactuals used to test reciprocity depend on the inequality level that is endogenously determined in the experiment by the choices of the investors.
We find evidence for trust in the triadic design. This evidence is robust with respect to investors' expectations. By using elicited expectations, in fact, we also find evidence of expected gains for each feasible investor's strategy. Instead, as often occurs in these kinds of experiments, we do not find evidence for reciprocity. However, after controlling for initial inequality (by using information from strategy method), we find that conditional motivations matter for reciprocity, if the inequality is low. While if inequality increases they have second-order effects and only altruism (inequality aversion) can be observed from the participants' behavior.
Finally, we tested evidence for a sort of emotional bias, i.e. whenever participants react differently from those planned when their expectations are not fulfilled. We find that the mismatch of expectations does not generate any bias. Indeed, our result is not surprising, because in our sample participants generally obtained what they have expected.
Appendix
The following table reports actual and expected values about the amount that subjects received in T1. We report the results for subject A and B (from both DM and SM). 
